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VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF SPOUSES
Durham v. Louisiana State Racing Commission:' The Louisiana
Supreme Court invalidated on statutory grounds a racing commission
ruling that prohibited a wife from racing horses after her husband was
disqualified from doing so. The court did not have to decide whether
the district court was correct in holding the rule unconstitutional.
Fox v. Louisiana State Racing Commission:2 The fourth circuit court
of appeal upheld a commission rule forbidding a wife from separately
entering a horse in a race in which her husband had entered a horse
owned by him.
Muller v. Ramar, Inc.:' The fifth circuit court of appeal, enforcing
a non-competition agreement signed by the husband upon the sale of
a corporation, also enjoined the wife from competing with the buyers.
Although these three cases did not decide constitutional issues, they
raise basic questions about the validity of laws which make one spouse
personally responsible for the conduct and contracts of the other. Guiding
principles in this area are not certain, but they at least caution against
treating the husband and wife as one entity or (to use the Biblical term)
as one flesh.
First, The Children
Under the Civil Code, parents are not only obligated to support a
child, but also are liable to third persons for damage caused by their
minor children. 4 The obligation exists even if the parents are not negligent
or otherwise culpable with respect to the conduct of the child; thus it
is a true vicarious liability.5 The parents are liable even for some damages
caused by non-discerning children; thus it is also a strict liability in
some cases.
6
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 449 So. 2d 475 (La. 1984). This article was completed before announcement of
the decision in Durham v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 449 So. 2d 475 (La. 1984).
In that split decision, the court reached the constitutional issue and found the statute did
not violate the constitution.
2. 447 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
3. 427 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 2318.
5. Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
6. Id.
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This heavy burden on parents is probably consistent with basic due
process values. The traditional justification for such a burden emphasizes
the right of the parent to control the child; arguably, the parent could
have exercised this control to prevent wrongful conduct. 7 The control
theory may well be questionable in terms of the realities of child be-
havior. A related argument may be more persuasive. Between the parents
and the innocent victim, the parents brought the child into existence,
guided its development, and produced the kind of individual who caused
the damage; they are, therefore, the ones on whom it is more reasonable
to place the loss. A more modern argument would also reflect a policy
of distributing losses widely; parents are more likely to be insured against
this type of risk, or are more likely to have had the opportunity to
obtain insurance.
A due process analysis of such tort liability indicates that the harm
to the individual interest is small (and insurable) and is balanced against
the interests of innocent third persons who can usually be said to be
blameless in rearing the kind of child who inflicted the injury.
When the sanctions against the parent becomes more serious, as
with criminal violations, one demands more justification for imputing
the act of the child to the parent. Louisiana's criminal code normally
requires individual liability and causation before there can be guilt, 8 and
developments in corporate criminal liability suggest a reluctance to extend
vicarious liability. 9 Louisiana courts would probably agree with the New
Hampshire court in State v. Akers10 and find a denial of due process
under the state constitution if a statute purported to make parents
criminally liable for the crimes of their minor children.
In examining penalties imposed by an administrative agency, the
proper inquiry would be to examine the extent of the harm and the
basis for imposing it. If the harm is great, or if it is punishment, the
analogy to criminal law seems clear." If the harm is slight or if the
nature of the award is more risk-spreading to benefit other individuals,
the tendency would probably be to analogize to civil responsibility. 2 In
the case punishing misconduct by suspending or removing governmental
entitlements (such as racing licenses) the criminal law analogy seems apt.
In any event, the development of vicarious liability for the acts of the
7. Id. at 274. See also Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1885).
8. La. Criminal Code: La. R.S. 14:7-9, 23-26 (1974); State v. Smith, 450 So. 2d
714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
9. State v. Chapman Dodge Center, Inc., 427 So. 2d 413 (La. 1983).
10. 119 N.H. 161, 400 A.2d 38 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S. Ct. 1843, reh'g denied, 396
U.S. 869 (1969).
12. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 689,
717, 719 (1930).
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child seems to have stopped at civil liability for tort and has not extended
to the criminal and administrative fields.
Then, The Employees
Employers have long been vicariously liable in civil matters for the
acts of their employees. In the case of minor crimes with small penalties
there is also some authority for imposing vicarious liability for the acts
of employees upon employers.' In these cases the employer has a right
of control which supports the constitutionality of the liability, and in
the usual case, control in fact.
It seems rational to extend vicarious liability further with employees,
if for no other reason than that there is more control in fact over
employees than children. Also, the decision of whether to impose vi-
carious liability often hinges on the necessity for doing so to accomplish
some regulatory scheme. Accordingly, it will more often be necessary
to include employees who usually do the work of the enterprise that
the state seeks to regulate, than it will be to control the family through
imposition of parental responsibility for the acts of the child.
Finally, The Spouses
In contrast to the rules applicable to minors, nothing in the Civil
Code makes a spouse civilly liable for the acts or contracts of the other
spouse. 4 A limited exception exists, regardless of the spouses' property
regime, which makes a spouse "solidarily liable with the other spouse
who incurs an obligation for necessaries for himself or the family. '"'5
Adoption of this exception, which is a new device to provide a means
of enforcing the spouses' duty to support each other and their children
by protecting the third-person provider of necessities when a spouse
defaults, confirms the basic rule that spouses have no general personal
liability for each other's acts. 16
This general vicarious liability rule for spouses is consistent with
the logic of the rule for children and employees because the foundation
of the latter rule, a right to control or some kind of neglect in guidance,
does not exist with respect to the spouses. Any contrary implication
from older rules about the husband's authority over the wife were
eliminated by the Emancipation Acts 17 and more recent equal protection
13. See, e.g., People v. Travers, 52 Cal. App. 3d 111, 124 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
848 (1960).
14. Comment, Liability of the Husband for Contractual Obligations of his Wife-
Louisiana Legislation and Jurisprudence, 30 La. L. Rev. 441 (1970).
15. La. Civ. Code art. 2372.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 2372, comment (a).
17. 1928 La. Acts, No. 283 (codified as La. R.S. 9:51-103 (1965)); 1926 La. Acts,
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developments in sex discrimination cases."8
A possible justification, in a more modern analysis, would be to
treat the husband and wife as an entity, and place the burden on the
family "enterprise." But the statutes regulating the husband and wife
"enterprise" preclude adoption of that consideration.
The matrimonial regimes revision allows spouses to be totally sep-
arate in property 9 so that no "property enterprise" attaches to their
marriage (except for necessaries, as mentioned at the beginning of this
section). If the spouses are under the community regime, the statute
itself limits the spouses' responsibility for each other's civil obligations-
article 2357 limits third persons to reaching the property of the com-
munity and that of the spouse who contracted the obligation at issue.20
A statutory analysis would conclude that the legislation does not
provide for vicarious liability of spouses in civil matters. On that basis
alone, the implications of Muller v. Ramar, Inc.2 are suspect. The result
in that case may be justified by the inference that the wife was not
actually running and owning the new business, but was an agent for
the husband in doing so. Nevertheless, the language of the decision is
too broad.
The problem is also serious on a constitutional level. A due process
attack against a scheme that makes a spouse liable for the future personal
obligations of the other spouse would call into question the state's
rational basis for imposing such an obligation. The state might argue
a theory of enterprise liability or a theory of having to accept future
personal obligations in return for sharing present property. But this
approach seems to be an overly intrusive one that would be an imper-
missible limitation on the right to marry.22 Some other basis would seem
to be required, absent some control by one spouse over the other or
some form of joint culpability between spouses.
In criminal matters, it seems that the doctrine of respondeat superior
has no place, as in the case of parents and children.2 3 Lack of control
would seem to prevent application of the employer-employee analogy.
Some old cases, coming from prosecutions for possession of liquor during
Prohibition, suggest that if the husband knew or acquiesed in the wife's
No. 132; 1921 La. Acts, Extra. Sess., No. 34; 1920 La. Acts, No. 219; 1918 La. Acts,
No. 244; 1916 La. Acts, No. 94.
18. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1060 (1980); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971); Note, Sex Discrimination:
Ad Hoc Review in the Highest Court, 35 La. L. Rev. 703 (1975).
19. La. Civ. Code art. 2371.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 2357. Personal liability is imposed on a spouse only when
that spouse alienates property of the former community for reasons other than payment
of community debts, and then only to the extent of the proceeds of the alienation.
21. 427 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
22. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978).
23. R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 911 (3d ed. 1982).
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possession of alcohol, he would be guilty under a form of vicarious
liability. 24 However, that view seems to have lost vitality.25
Imposition of penalties in administrative hearings would seem to
produce a similar result. In Durham,26 the wife was punished because
of alleged misconduct by the husband; both were suspended from racing
horses. That harm was perhaps more serious than a minor criminal
penalty; the district court was probably consistent with basic due process
values in holding the action of the racing commission to be unconsti-
tutional.
Fox 7 is a closer case. It involves not a penalty for wrongdoing but
a regulation aimed at preventing collusion between persons whom the
commission apparently believes are more likely to engage in such activities
than others. Still, it limits the right to race horses, a form of "property"
established under state law.2" The government's justification for dimin-
ishing this property interest is based on its interest in preventing a class
of persons from engaging in conduct when collusion might likely occur.
At this level, however, the analysis increasingly becomes an equal pro-
tection inquiry, and the proper inquiry is one of whether the state has
a rational basis, not just for preventing collusion, but for singling out
this class (married persons) as likely violators of rules because of their
close relationship. In an equal protection inquiry, if the classification
affects a fundamental right, which the right to marry has been declared
to be,2 9 the current analysis requires the state to prove not just a rational
basis for the distinction, but a stronger governmental interest. Such an
interest is hard to find, particularly since the law does not impose a
similar disability upon siblings, ascendents and descendants, and persons
who are "living together." As the last-mentioned relationship is becoming
more common, it becomes even more difficult to exclude them and
include married persons."
In any event, a basic statutory principle and a related constitutional
doctrine come into play here. The basic notion is that of individual
responsibility for one's own conduct, not group responsibility or col-
lective responsibility. The status-related laws governing marriage do not
impose liability upon one spouse for acts of the other. The property-
24. State v. Weeden, 164 La. 713, 114 So. 604 (1927); State v. Arrigoni, 119 Wash.
358, 205 P.7 (1922).
25. Miller v. State, 170 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 177 So.
2d 475 (Fla. 1965); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 380 (1972).
26. 449 So. 2d 475 (La. 1984).
27. 447 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
28. See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 10-9 to -11, at 514-32
(1978) (discussing entitlements as property).
29. Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978).
30. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 98 S. Ct. 1029 (1972) (denial of equal
protection to deny unmarried women access to contraceptives while allowing access to
married women).
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related laws governing matrimonial regimes, separate and community,
establish a limited liability of property for the debts of both spouses,
but this does not extend to personal liability. It is probably a statutory
and constitutional error to think of the couple as a single legal entity
in these instances and to fail to treat them as individuals.
But, On The Other Hand
The foregoing analysis has strong support in the legislation, in the
few cases that have faced these issues, and in light of a fundamental
right of spouses to their own juridical personality and integrity. This
analysis is also supported by current equal protection values as they
apply to men and women. These concerns relating to the rights of
spouses are especially relevant when marriages are failing and the parties
are contentious. They often reflect a reality among a growing number
of married couples who do carefully keep their property interests separate
and who choose to limit their union to the status-related consequences
of marriage without the property-related consequences."'
A possibility exists, however, of cooperative spouses using the prin-
ciples asserted here to the unfair detriment of third persons or to avoid
reasonable regulations. That the fear of such transactions is real is
reflected by Civil Code articles 2374 and 2376 which allow creditors to
object to the creation of a separation of property regime if it is in
fraud of their rights. Louisiana courts tend to suspect that intra-family
sales and exchanges are simulations more than they suspect such trans-
actions between other persons.32 Codes of Ethics prohibit certain trans-
actions by individuals (and their spouses and children) and any controlled
legal entity,33 and the tax laws require certain transactions to be with
non-cooperating parties in order to receive favorable tax treatment.3 4
Other examples abound. At the least, they represent some reflection
of a view that cooperating persons pose a problem of harm to third
persons in various types of transactions, that close family members are
likely to be in the group of such cooperating persons, and that spouses
are often as close as one can get in these relationships.
Indeed, there is a concern in cases like Muller's that the creative
force in the new competing business was not the spouse who had never
been in such a business before but the experienced spouse who had the
knowledge and contacts to make the business successful. One way to
31. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
92 S. Ct. 251 (1971).
32. See, e.g., Harman v. Defatta, 182 La. 463, 162 So. 44 (1935); Joiner v. Ruark,
174 La. 615, 141 So. 76 (1932).
33. E.g., La. R.S. 42:1112 (1965) (prohibition of state dealings with immediate family
of public official).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 267(b)(1) (1983); 26 U.S.C. § 267(c)(4) (1983).
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avoid these problems is simply to avoid presumptions as much as possible
and to require proof of collusion-proof, for example, that the wife
was inexperienced and that she was the "agent" of the husband who
signed the agreement, or proof that the husband and wife would be
likely to engage in collusion with respect to pulling their horses. It seems
that the larger the class covered by extending the rule to those other
than husband and wife who present similar problems, the greater likelihood
of a constitutionally sufficient basis to support the limitation.
Some Special Cases
As discussed earlier, respondeat superior does not impose vicarious
liability of spouses for the criminal offenses of the other spouse. A
broad concept of possession, however, may serve to do the same thing
with possessory offenses.
Consider a husband convicted of simple burglary who is thus pro-
hibited by article 95.1 of the Criminal Code from "possess[ing] a fire-
arm" and whose wife buys a pistol which she keeps in her dresser
drawer in a bedroom she shares with her husband. She is not prohibited
from possessing the weapon and can claim the constitutional right to
bear arms. To make the husband guilty simply because he is married
to her and otherwise exercising his civil law rights and fulfilling an
obligation to live with his spouse35 would seem to offend our basic
principle against vicarious liability in criminal law. But, allowing the
possession may also give easy access to a weapon for a person that the
law wants to keep weaponlesss.
Perhaps the former argument can be weakened by pointing out that
this liability is not vicarious liability based on the status of being husband
and wife; it is direct liability based on sharing living quarters. The law
imposes liability here just as it does with convicted felons who share
living quarters with lovers and roommates. In any event, there is a
danger of adopting too broad a concept of possession that would result
in vicarious liability for another's acts. 6
Perhaps the way to avoid this constitutional difficulty is to recognize
that the possession offense is not an end in itself, but a means to
accomplish prevention of use and distribution of the thing. A deeper
35. There are cases which say that possession does not mean ownership (which also
explains why the separate or community nature of the gun should make no difference
here)-it means dominion and control. With the discretion the appellate courts have given
fact finders in terms of determining dominion or control, it would seem easy to classify
as possession the case where the gun is in a dresser drawer available to the husband by
opening it. State v. Smith, 257 La. 1109, 1114, 245 So. 2d 327, 329 (1971).
36. See, e.g., Knighton v. State, 248 Ga. 199, 282 S.E.2d 102 (1981) (declaring
unconstitutional statutory presumption that contraband in a home belongs to husband);
State v. Barmore, 451 So. 2d 1218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (overturning conviction of
possession with intent to distribute as to girlfriend).
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inquiry into the other spouse's participation in the use or facilitating
the use of the prohibited thing may lead to the kind of individual
culpability that would tend to lessen the problem of vicarious liability.
VESTED RIGHTS
The levee servitude has traditionally made riparian lands available
to the state for levee construction purposes outside of eminent domain.
For years the exercise of the levee servitude required no compensation;37
since 1921 compensation at assessed value was available statewide.38 In
1978, the legislature ostensibly expanded the measure of compensation
by adopting a statute providing for compensation at actual cash value.
That standard applied to "any expropriation or appropriation suit pend-
ing on July 10, 1978." ' 9 The following year, the legislature "corrected"
this language to make the new standard apply to "lands appropriated,
used or damaged for levees. . .after July 10, 1978." 40 This change raised
the problem of abolishing the higher level of compensation for Suits
pending on July 10, 1978 that contested earlier appropriations.
In Terrebonne v. South Lafourche Tidal Control Levee Dist.,41 the
supreme court determined that application of the new statute to such
pending suits would be a divesting of a right vested by the earlier
legislation and thus violate due process. The court pursued the standard
due process analysis by which the change was found to affect a sub-
stantive right rather than being a procedural change. Since the case
involved a declaratory judgment, the full determination of amounts
recoverable was not at issue, and the supreme court simply reversed the
court of appeal and remanded to the district court for rendition of a
declaratory judgment.
However, a further problem in the case leaves open a'basic vested
rights issue. The right that was vested in 1978 is protected against change
of deprivation. The 1978 legislation, however, did not establish an
unconditional right to actual cash value compensation. The same subpart
that establishes the right states:
The owner shall be compensated as provided in this Subsection
only when and if, in its discretion, the Louisiana Legislature,
the levee board, or the federal government, appropriates the
funds therefor. 42
37. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 16 S. Ct. 345 (1896).
38. La. Const. of 1921, art. XVI, § 6.
39. 1978 La. Acts, No. 314, § 1.
40. La. R.S. 38:281 (Supp. 1984), as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 676, § 1.
41. 445 So. 2d. 1221 (La. 1984).
42. La. R.S. 38:281(B)(1) (Supp. 1984); See also Dakin, Developments in the Law,
1982-1983-Expropriation, 44 La. L. Rev. 357, 357 n.5 (1983).
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Clumsy perhaps. But this language added by a floor amendment is
a reflection of the political bargaining that went into the statute-the
absolute right in the original bill was watered down to a matter of
discretion on the part of government agencies with the power to ap-
propriate.4 3 It may well be true that this right is a substantive, vested
right; but even after Terrebonne recognized this fact, it does not nec-
essarily mean that the landowners will be paid. What was vested ulti-
mately depends on the discretion of the legislature. To this writer's
knowledge there has yet to be an appropriation for these purposes.
DUE PROCEss-TERMINATION OF AN INCOMPETENT'S PARENTAL
RIGHTS
State ex rel. A.E. & J.D.44 allows a hearing to determine whether
parental rights are to be terminated even though the parent is mentally
incompetent and comatose. An attorney appointed to represent the mother
argued it was a denial of due process to proceed because she would be
unable to understand the proceedings and assist in her defense. The
facts of the case were extreme: since 1971 the mother had exhibited
mental instability, had been charged with abusing her two-year. old son
by attempting to drown him in a public fountain; she collapsed in a
street, was found to have serious brain damage, was comatose and
unable to care for herself or to communicate; the fathers of her two
illegitimate children were unknown or absent.
The court of appeal relied on Santosky v. Kramer4 and Mathews
v. Eldridge46 in determining whether a hearing without the mother's
participation was fundamentally fair, and thus looked to "the private
interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the
State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest
supporting use of the challenged procedure. ' 47 Though the individual
interest (relationship with a child) is one given great weight, the coun-
tervailing governmental interest in providing a stable and nurturing re-
lationship to the child is also strong. The risk of error would appear
to be small since the governing procedure provides for attorney repre-
sentation of the parent's interest.4 8
The mother's attorney had argued, by analogy to criminal trials,
43. The original bill simply proposed actual cash value compensation. A senate floor
amendment that added the language that such compensation would be paid "only when
and to the extent that the Legislature, the levee board, or the Federal Government
appropriates the funds therefor." See La. S.B. No. 807, Official Journal of the Proceedings
of the Senate of the State of Louisiana 4th Reg. Sess. 954-55 (May 31, 1978).
44. 448 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
45. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
46. 424 U.S. 319, 98 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
47. Mathews, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S. Ct. at 1394.
48. La. R.S. 13:1602 (1983).
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that the interest at stake was as important or more so than the loss of
liberty involved in a criminal proceeding, which by statute and consti-
tutional doctrine cannot be had if the defendant is not capable of
understanding the proceedings and assisting in his defense.4 9 That ar-
gument has some merit, but the court points out that the criminal law
analogy does not necessarily apply. Here, the additional concern for the
well-being of the child is a more important governmental interest, pre-
sumably, than proceeding with a criminal trial. Also, the risk of error
in determining facts in a termination proceeding is less than in the
normal criminal trial. In the former, issues of mental and physical
condition can be addressed without the mother's knowing participation.
Alternatively, in a criminal trial, questions of conduct plus mental state
would be at issue. Furthermore, the defense might raise justification
defenses (self-defense, compulsion, etc.) involving the defendant's per-
ceptions and beliefs which cannot readily be inquired into without the
participation of the defendant.
Although one can define the issue here as a procedural one, it is
also a substantive question. If one decides that the hearing cannot
proceed, there can be no termination of parental rights at all in these
circumstances. Similarily, every interdiction and commitment based on
a person's mental incapacity would be in question if one determines
that knowing and intelligent participation in the proceeding is a condition
to its validity. Such a view would virtually abolish all interdiction and
commitment for mental health reasons.
In the instant case, the court simply decided the procedural issue
and remanded for determination of the case on the merits. It did not
have occasion to decide the substantive question of whether it would
be a denial of substantive due process to terminate the parent's rights
and allow for adoption of the children. Those issues pose more complex
and difficult considerations.
Substantive Due Process Considerations- The Family Interest
One can criticize the United States Supreme Court for establishing
some kind of hierarchy of individual rights and interests, particularly
since the source of such value-oriented decisions is not certain and though
the exact weighting of different rights is not clear. Nevertheless, the
cases tend to reflect an intutive view that marriage, children, and family
are among the most important and basic interests. Long ago, Skinner
v. Oklahoma ° placed great weight on the interest in procreation and
limited state-required sterilization; Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer
49. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S. Ct. 440 (1956); La. Code Crim.
P. art. 648.
50. 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942).
51. 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925).
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v. Nebraska2 recognized the importance of the interest in educating
children as parents directed. Modern cases, from Loving v. Virginia53
(banning miscegenation laws) to Wisconsin v. Yoder 4 (reaffirming pa-
rental control over religious training of children) also suggest that the
interest being protected is more than just the right to decide whether
or not to have children, 5 but extends to the broader interest of guiding
the upbringing of children. This view is also expressed in the heavy
burden of proof required to justify termination of parental rights, and
in the application of a high level of equal protection scrutiny when a
state attempts to limit parental rights.5 6
The developing "right of family" includes a recognition of a strong
interest in the broader family relationship. In Moore v. East Cleveland, 7
the special relation between a grandmother and two grandchildren who
were not siblings was found to be fundamental. Justice Powell's plurality
opinion relied on the traditional importance placed on family interests:
"The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition." 58 In a
separate opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall also criticized a "cul-
tural myopia" 5 9 that would not recognize the rights of the "extended
family." 60
An easy conclusion from these developments is that the parents'
right to continue a parent-child relationship will be given the highest
consideration. The expanding family rights concept suggests even more-
that the interests of the child's other relatives is important. In the instant
case, the fathers of the two children were unknown or missing and there
was no indication of other family members having an interest in rearing
the children. In other instances, however, if the governmental interest
in providing for the child' a stable, caring setting is strong, then grand-
parents, uncles, aunts, or other close family wanting to provide that
care have a family interest that should be given great weight. It may
well be that a person with blood ties to the child will be more likely
to provide continuity, care, and stability and continue the legal rela-
tionship with the parent without severing it.6 1
52. 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).
53. 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967).
54. 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
56. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769, 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
57. 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
58. Id. at 504, 97 S. Ct. at 938.
59. Id. at 507, 97 S. Ct. at 1940.
60. Id. at 508, 97 S. Ct. at 1940.
61. State ex rel. A.E. & J.D., 448 So. 2d at 187.
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Under a state constitutional due process analysis, there is also au-
thority for finding that the state's traditional policy is to emphasize the
extended family and not just the parent-child relationship. The traditional
preferences in selecting tutors,62 for example, provide such a statement
of state policy; the more recent legislation giving grandparents certain
visitation rights when their child is denied custody of a grandchild are
another example. 63
A Miraculous Recovery?
Another concern in all of this is the severity of the parent's incapacity
and the likelihood of recovery from the physical or mental illness in-
volved. Presumably, the greater the likelihood of no recovery, the greater
the weight to be placed on the state's interest. In recent years, advances
in the use of drugs to treat mental illness have been substantial, and
the use of experts in these determinations will be necessary. 64 Again, in
the instant case, these problems are not serious, for it appears that the
mother's recovery was unlikely.
Necessity
It would also appear that the drastic remedy of terminating a parents
rights should not come into play absent a plan for adoption of the
child. 65 The custody of the child can be handled (in relatives or foster
care) without severing the parent-child relationship that adoption in-
volves. Only if the additional step of adoption is contemplated ought
there be the requirement of terminating the parent's rights. This being
so, the substantive standard for adoption would also come into play,
essentially the qualifications of the prospective parents and the best
interest of the child.
66  I
This is "constitutional facts" emphasis to a profound degree. In-
volved are questions of expert medical and psychological testimony,
investigations and determinations about the best interest of children, and
determination of qualifications of prospective parents. It is arguable that
this is not the kind of inquiry courts ought to be involved in at all,
especially federal courts, as Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent in
Santowsky. 67 But, the basic principles seem to require the court to enter
this area, and to weigh basic interests. 68 The alternative is to allow the
62. La. Civ. Code art. 263.
63. La. Civ. Code art. 157.
64. E. Beis, Mental Health and the Law 263-65 (1984).
65. See La. R.S. 13:1601(E)(4) & (F)(6) (1983). But see State ex rel. Boudreaux, 427
So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (awarding permanent custody to foster parents and
terminating natural parents' rights without a plan for adoption).
66. La. R.S. 9:432(B) (1965).
67. 455 U.S. at 772 n.2, 102 S. Ct. at 1404 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. 455 U.S. at 775 n.3, 103 S. Ct. at 1405-06 n.3.
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states to legislate at will with respect to terminating parental rights. If
no terminations are allowed, the children might suffer; if termination
is easy and unreviewable, the parents might suffer. Further, state courts
will be required to be involved in these issues as long as there is some
legislation on the subject, and under state constitutional law principles,
it is not much of an additional step to consider the constitutional
dimensions as well as the related statutory matters.
Indeed, even without the federal case developments, the Louisiana
Constitution seems itself to support the inquiry. Due process as reflected
in the case of State ex rel Monroe v. Ford69 would come into play, as
would equal protection, for the 1974 Constitution provides that there
can be no arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable discrimination because
of "physical condition. ' ' 70 In the instant case, the serious physical illness
would seem to require some inquiry into the reasonableness for ter-
minating the parent's rights when similarly-situated persons not in such
a "physical condition" would not have their rights terminated.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS AND HALF-WAY HOUSES
When property limited by conventional building restrictions to single
family dwellings is sought to be used as a group home for mentally
retarded persons, several related statutory and constitutional issues come
into play. Such residential housing for the mentally retarded is thought
to be beneficial to them and preferable to institutionalization, but is
often objected to by neighbors. In Tucker v. Special Children's Foun-
dation,7' the opening salvo in this dispute in Louisiana, the first circuit
court of appeal refused to enforce the building restriction against a
group home.
Construing the Building Restriction Agreement
Building restrictions are established by contract and their application
governed by the terms of the agreement. Specific provisions against
homes for mentally retarded persons or against unrelated groups oc-
cupying a home would pose no problem of construction,72 but in the
usual case, the restriction will be less clear-often that the property be
used only as "single family dwelling." In Tucker, the agreement des-
ignated all the subdivision lots as "residential lots, and no building shall
be erected . . . other than one (1) detached single family dwelling not
to exceed two and one-half stories in height and a private garage or
carport for not less than two (2) nor more than three (3) cars." '73
69. 164 La. 149, 113 So. 798 (1927) (stating that citizens "cannot be deprived of
their legal rights otherwise than in the manner expressly pointed out by law").
70. La. Const. art. I, § 3.
71. 449 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
72. See, e,g., Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974).
73. 449 So. 2d at 46.
1984]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
In such a case, a simple threshold argument is that the restriction
does not prohibit the contemplated use-occupation of a house by six
unrelated persons and two counselors. The reference to a "single family
dwelling" would be construed to refer to a type of structure rather than
to its occupants. The majority in Tucker seems to accept without much
discussion the view that the intent of the parties to the agreement must
have been to limit uses, 74 but the concurring opinion apparently concludes
otherwise and states that the contemplated use is not prohibited by the
restriction.
If one takes the majority's approach that the phrase "single family
dwelling" excludes the group occupancy in question, what then of two
elderly siblings who occupy such a structure? They are not a "family"
in the usual sense. Neither is the grandmother living with two grand-
children who were not siblings, as in Moore v. East Cleveland.75 Sim-
ilarly, what of a heterosexual unmarried couple, a homosexual couple,
two platonic college roommates? At the least, the majority's catapulting
the phrase "single family dwelling" into a use restriction based on what
may have been the intent of the contracting parties leads to many
uncertain and unclear applications.
If one looks to other terms in the clause in contest, one finds a
''use limitation" that the lot be used as "residential" as opposed to
commercial. This is consistent with the reference to single family dwelling
as indicating a type of structure. The argument is fortified by the term
dwelling being modified by two and one-half stories of height and certain
types of garage or carport,76 references more related to structure than
type of use.
Such a speculative inquiry about the intent of parties is unnecessary,
however. Civil Code article 783, incorporating prior jurisprudence, 77
specifies that doubt as to the extent of building restrictions is to be
resolved in favor of unrestricted use.78 In this case, such a threshold
analysis would have precluded the necessity of discussing constitutional
issues on a thin factual record in a hearing on a preliminary injunction
request. Also, deciding such matters as contractual interpretation ques-
tions would leave the legislature more flexibility in addressing these
problems in the future.
Validity of the Building-Use Restriction under the Civil Code
It is an elementary proposition that individuals cannot by their
contracts "derogate from the force of laws made for the preservation
74. Id.
75. 431 U.S. 494, 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1952 (1977).
76. 449 So. 2d at 46.
77. See, e.g., McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So. 2d 154 (1960); Herzberg v.
Harrison, 102 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
78. La. Civ. Code art. 783.
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of public order or good morals." '7 9 Put another way, the state has
announced generally that it will not lend its coercive power to enforce
contracts that are inconsistent with basic public policies. In the building
restrictions field it is settled that the state will not enforce restrictions
that keep property out of commerce for unreasonably long periods.8 0
In recent years, building restrictions that grant architectural control
committees a virtually standardless veto power over construction projects
have not been enforced.8 There is also developing a general view that
private restrictions that are substantially inconsistent with zoning rules
will not be enforced. 82
The inquiry here is not a constitutional one, but one based on
traditional civil code principles. While it analyzes governmental interests
and the depth of the public interest in certain policies, as would be the
case in a constitutional analysis, it avoids cementing a rule as consti-
tutional doctrine. There still remains the opportunity for the legislature
to act and define with more precision the public interest involved,
consistently or inconsistently with the court's thoughts about the public
policy in a given case.
In the half-way house situation, one would decide whether a re-
striction that prevents the occupation of residential structures in resi-
dential neighborhoods by persons who need a residential environment
as part of their therapy is derogating from laws made for preservation
of public order and good morals. The inquiry here is somewhat open-
ended, with little guiding authority in the cases. But there is the op-
portunity to undertake a rigorous analysis of the state's interest here
and the sources of that interest.83
In a case such as Tucker, the inquiry would have to be whether
the restriction as applied to a particular use was a violation of some
public policy, and not whether the restriction in the abstract would be
such a violation. It would leave room to conclude that the restriction,
for example, could not be applied to limit this prospective use but would
still remain available against fast food outlets. This is similar to the
approach of the first circuit court of appeal in 4626 Corporation v.
Merriam,84 where the court declined to rule in the abstract whether a
restriction giving power to an architectural committee was valid, but
79. La. Civ. Code art. 11.
80. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
81. Lake Forest, Inc. v. Drury, 352 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); cf. 4626
Corp. v. Merriam, 329 So. 2d 885 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
82. Berger, Conflicts Between Zoning Ordinances and Restrictive Covenants: A Prob-
lem in Land Use Policy, 43 Neb. L. Rev. 449 (1964); Comment, Some Observations on
Building Restrictions, 41 La. L. Rev. 1201, 1211-12 (1981).
83. 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 236, at 427-28, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
84. 329 So. 2d 885 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
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looked instead to whether a particular exercise of its power was rea-
sonable.8"
The suggested analysis here is one that scans the state's laws and
basic values to determine those subjects which reflect important state
policies from which individuals cannot derogate. It is not the application
of a statute which establishes a certain rule; if it were so, it would raise
the problem of legislation depriving citizens of an existing contractual
right. However, in the suggested analysis, there is not such an application
of a legislative act, but the application of a judicially-perceived principle
or policy that can fairly be said to exist at the time of the establishment
of the restriction. The decision is not so much that the restriction now
conflicts with a statute passed after the restriction was adopted, but a
decision that the contract never established a valid restriction because
of a conflict with a strong public policy.
Construing the Community Home Statute
It is difficult to find a clear legislative command requiring that
building restrictions give way to landowners who wish to establish com-
munity homes for the mentally retarded. The only guidance is a definition
of community home in the definitions section of the chapter on Mental
Health and Developmental Disability Law.16 That law first appeared in
1978 as part of a comprehensive package of rules relating to treatment
and care for mentally disabled persons; the definition section there simply
defined a "community facility." ' 87 In 1982, the entire chapter was amended
and reenacted, the term "community home" first appearing and defined
to mean living options for mentally disabled persons providing residential
services to fifteen or fewer mentally retarded individuals. The next
sentence then provided that community homes "that provide for six or
fewer mentally retarded individuals, with no more than two live-in staff,
shall be considered single family units having common interests, goals,
and problems." The section concludes with the statement that a home
providing options for 7 to 15 mentally retarded persons is a "group
home." 88 The 1983 amendment and reenactment made no change in
these provisions.8 9
The odd word choice in the definition-single family unit-does not
relate to other state laws or the traditional usage in agreements referring
to single family dwellings. It is also odd to refer to the community
home as a group of people (family unit) rather than a structure. Ap-
parently, the language comes from a 1981 case which construed a zoning
85. Id. at 889.
86. La. R.S. 28:381(8) (Supp. 1984).
87. 1978 La. Acts, No. 680, § 381(6).
88. 1982 La. Acts, No. 538, § 381(5).
89. La. R.S. 28:381(8) (Supp. 1984), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 659, §
381(5).
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ordinance which referred to a single family in terms of a single house-
keeping unit.9 0 In any event, there is no statement in the law that
zoning laws or building restrictions must use this definition. In fact,
the statutes which define "community home" limit that definition to
"purposes of this Chapter,'' 9' the chapter on mental health retardation.
If there was a legislative purpose of forcing cities and private groups
to accept such homes, the legislature certainly expressed that intent in
a qualified and uncertain way. Indeed, even if one were eventually to
conclude that such was the purpose despite the sloppy drafting, a look
at the title of the bill which produced that effect discloses nothing about
such a purpose. Therefore, it is arguable that the change would be
unconstitutional as the product of a bill that had a title that was not
indicative of its object. 92
The Tucker court does not address this issue, and seems to assume
that the statute was designed to limit the applicability of private agree-
ments in this regard. However, it is submitted that the question is an
open one, one probably best resolved in favor of free use of property
and construing statutes to avoid decision of unnecessary constitutional
questions. The result in this case would be to allow private rights to
continue to be exercised as before, leaving it open to the legislature to
express itself more clearly and certainly on the topic of whether it wants
to displace private rights.
The Due Process-Contracts Clause Issue
In Tucker, the court assumed that the state had acted, to require
community homes as defined above to be considered single family dwell-
ings within the meaning of building restrictions. That conclusion raised
the question of whether such state action was a taking of property
without due process, or more narrowly, a law impairing the obligation
of contracts.
In a straight due process analysis, where the adjacent landowners'
rights to limit use would be considered a type of property, there may
be more governmental latitude in restricting some of the rights associated
with property ownership, and a relatively easy argument in favor of the
reasonableness of the restriction on private property ownership. That
argument is more difficult to make, however, in light of the state
constitution's emphasis on property rights. 93
90. City of West Monroe v. Ouachita Ass'n for Retarded Children, 402 So. 2d 259
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
91. La. R.S. 28:381 (Supp. 1984).
92. La. Const. art. III, § 15(a); Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 36 La. L. Rev. 533, 546-
47 (1976).
93. La. Const. art. I, § 4; Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights: A Selective Analysis
of the Louisiana Constitution-1974, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 9, 19-27 (1975); Hargrave, The
Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
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But that battle does not have to be fought here; there is the additional
constitutional provision against impairing (not just taking) the obligation
of contracts. Unquestionably a contract exists here, one which established
a real right in favor of adjacent lots that obligated owners not make
certain uses of property. That right undoubtedly was destroyed. While
there is some flexibility in a contract clause analysis, there probably is
less than in a due process approach, for the constitutional values are
quite explicit in extending strong protection to existing contractual rights.
The court in Tucker faced this issue and concluded that the legislature
acted within its police power. That may be true, but to invoke "police
power" in this regard is simply to recognize that the legislature has the
power to do anything it chooses absent some limitation. 94 That is the
beginning of an analysis that then considers whether there are any
limitations on government in this regard. This would then lead to an
analysis into the requirements of a contract clause argument.
One can readily argue private individuals strongly relied on the
restriction; it is a common fact of life that the character of neighborhoods
depends in many respects on the enforcement of building restrictions
and that such matters of protection of neighborhood qualities95 and
property values are of exceptional importance to people. 96 Normally,
these factors will profoundly affect the value of a person's most valuable
asset. The reliance factor here would seem quite high. And, since the
existing building restriction law provides for informal waivers being
inferred from the existence of violations that have continued without
objection, one must look beyond the reliance on a particular restriction; 97
it is necessary to object to uses that might otherwise be less invasive
94. Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975); Hargrave, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 36
La. L. Rev. 533, 533-35 (1976).
95. See Chief Justice Burger's use, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, of Professor
Theodore Bickel's observation:
It concerns the tone of the society, the mode, or to use terms that have perhaps
greater currency, the style and quality of life, now and in the future. A man
may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room, or expose himself indecently
there .... We should protect his privacy. But if he demands a right to obtain
the books and pictures he wants in the market, and to foregather in public
places-discreet, if you will, but accessible to all-with others who share his
tastes, then to grant him -his right is to affect the world about the rest of us,
and to impinge on other privacies. Even supposing that each of us can, if he
wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot),
what is commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all,
want it or not.
413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
96. See Guernsey, The Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants, 25 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 421 (1984); Comment, Some Observations on Building Restrictions, 41
La. L. Rev. 1201 (1981).
97. La. Civ. Code art. 782.
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of someone's interest because to fail to do so may mean losing the
more important restriction. Building restrictions are more difficult to
alter than zoning laws, again emphasizing the reliance interest on their
existence.98
Building restrictions are real rights that function like servitudes, 99
and it is long established that such real rights over other tracts of land
are protected interests; the mineral royalty and mineral servitude rights
on a tract of land are similar and are clearly protected by the contract
clause. ,oo
On the other side are several public policy interests, as discussed
earlier, but it is a detailed and precise analysis that must explore these
matters and the reliance and justification for reliance before one can
work to a conclusion. In short, it may well be contrary to the realities
of modern day subdivisions to say that the reliance interest here is not
strong.
This is not to say the state cannot take this right away; but will
have to pay for taking such a vested right.101 Granted, this may be a
hollow remedy to the landowner, for it will be quite difficult to prove
the extent of the loss, but that fact still does not justify the failure to
allow the landowner an opportunity to establish his loss and to prove
its extent.
The Equal Protection Issue
Equal protection arguments were not raised in Tucker, but they are
relevant here, especially in light of the Cleburne0 2 case in which a panel
of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a zoning
ordinance which was changed to prohibit group homes for the mentally
retarded in apartment districts when a group sought to open one was
a denial of equal protection of the laws. The court was willing to impose
a higher level of scrutiny in this case of discrimination against the
mentally handicapped and found inadequate justification for the differing
treatment. If such action is a violation of equal protection, it would
appear that Shelley v. Kraemer'03 would come into play and require that
government not enforce such private discriminatory restrictions.
98. La. Civ. Code arts. 780-82.
99. La. Civ. Code art. 777.
100. La. Mineral Code: La. R.S. 31:21 (1975).
101. But see Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 2 v. Dean, 345 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977) (criticized in A. Yiannopoulos, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1976-1977 Term-Property, 38 La. L. Rev. 332, 341 (1978).
102. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne,.726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984) (In a 9-6 vote, the dissenters objected to the panel's
classification of retarded citizens as a suspect class such that regulations applicable to
them would be subject to heightened or intermediate scrutiny.).
103. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948).
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Still, some fine distinctions must be made. In Cleburne, an ordinance
was changed when a group home was proposed, supporting inferences
of intent to, discriminate. On the other hand, in dealing.with a long-
standing restriction confining uses to single family dwellings that one
cannot connect in time to proposed uses for a community home, it
would be difficult to prove the intent to discriminate which would seem
to be required before there can be a violation of equal protection. 1°4
Another difference is that the Tucker facts deal with a residential
restriction where interests with respect to density and the character of
a neighborhood may justify the restriction, whereas the Cleburne apart-
ment zoning already allowed for dense areas and a type of institution-
alized atmosphere that would be less damaged by the proposed use.
But, in those instances where the discriminatory animus is present, it
would appear that equal protection would prohibit the enforcement of
the building restrictions.
104. Mobile v Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980); Washington v Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
